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Quantum key distribution (QKD), ensuring the unconditional security of information, attracts a
significant deal of interest. An important task is to design QKD systems as a platform for education
as well as for research and development applications and fast prototyping new QKD protocols. Here
we present a modular QKD setup driven by National Instruments (NI) cards with open source
LabView code, open source Python code for post-processing procedures, and open source protocol
for external applications. An important feature of the developed apparatus is its flexibility offering
possibilities to modify optical schemes and verify novel QKD protocols. Another distinctive feature
of the developed setup is the implementation of the decoy-state protocol, which is a standard tool
for secure long-distance quantum communications. By testing the plug-and-play scheme realizing
BB84 and decoy-state BB84 QKD protocols, we demonstrate that developed QKD setup shows a
high degree of robustness beyond laboratory conditions. We demonstrate the results of the use of
the developed modular setup for urban QKD experiments.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the view of a possible appearance of universal quan-
tum computers in the next decades, the only way to en-
sure long-term information security is to use tools pro-
viding unconditional security such as the one-time pad
scheme [1–3]. The crucial obstacle towards the implemen-
tations of unconditional security mechanisms is the key
distribution problem [3].
An elegant way, which allows overcoming this difficulty,
is to use QKD [4–7]. QKD provides a useful technique for
the generation of private random keys between legitimate
remote users (Alice and Bob). It should be noted that in
the classical world the mechanism preventing an eaves-
dropper (Eve) copying keys during their transmission is
in fact absent. The crucial feature of the QKD technology
is using of quantum objects as information carriers [4–7].
Due to the quantum no-cloning theorem [8], Eve is un-
able to keep a copy of sent quantum signals. Thus, QKD
is a method offering information-theoretic security based
on the physics laws. Remarkably, QKD is one of the first
quantum technologies operating with individual quantum
objects available as a commodity [9].
However, an important demand is to design QKD plat-
forms for research and development (R&D) applications.
They are meaningful for testing novel QKD protocols and
demonstrations of attacks, as well as for educational pur-
poses. A progressive platform for R&D in quantum cryp-
tography is Clavis [11], which is the generation of QKD
setups by ID Quantique [11]. This setup has been widely
used in experiments on realization of novel QKD pro-
tocols, quantum hacking [12–14], testing post-processing
algorithms [15], quantum coin flipping [15], and many
others tasks. Some of QKD setups have been designed,
e.g. in order to show a cost-effective approach to the de-
veloping QKD systems [16–18]. Nevertheless, the decoy-
state method [19], which can guarantee the security of
the BB84 protocol [19–22] and has already been realized
in most of QKD setups, is still missing in QKD systems
for R&D and educational purposes. This lack limits the
capabilities of such systems significantly.
Here we present a modular QKD setup for education,
research and development applications. The crucial fea-
tures of the developed apparatus are its modularity and
flexibility offering possibilities to modify optical schemes,
and this versatility is a key difference from other research-
oriented QKD setups available on the market. The ver-
satility is essential for table-top realizations of new QKD
technologies, which demand additional tools for quantum
states manipulation [31] or hybrid quantum-classical in-
formation transmitting in a single fiber [32]. A distinctive
feature of the developed setup is the implementation of
the basic version of the decoy-state protocol [22].
The developed setup is driven by NI cards with open
source LabView code [23] for control and operating, open
source Python code for the post processing [25], and open
source protocol for external applications [30]. The QKD
setup can operate with any type of single-photon detec-
tors (for details, see Refs. [11, 34–36]) including super-
conducting single-photon detectors [36]. The external
drivers of single-photon detectors, phase modulators, and
synchronization detectors are realized as removable mod-
ules. Each device can drive up to 8 detectors, 7 slow
ports (VOA and etc.) and 5 universal ports for lasers,
phase or amplitude modulators. The software solution
in charge of controlling the system is written with the
use of the development environment LabVIEW [23]. It
is a popular tool used by scientists and others, mostly for
data acquisition, instrument control, and industrial au-
tomation [24]. We then consider LabVIEW as an optimal
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2choice for educational purposes as well as for R&D.
Our paper is organized as follows. We start by describ-
ing the developed QKD setup in Sec. II. In Sec. III, we
present the results of testing of the simplified version of
the plug-and-play QKD scheme for laboratory and ur-
ban conditions. In Sec. IV, we demonstrate operating of
the developed QKD with the decoy-state QKD protocol.
In Sec. V, we describe the basics of the post-processing
procedure with a focus on the analysis of the decoy-state
statistics. We summarize the main results of the present
work and discuss further prospects in Sec. VI.
II. MODULAR QKD SETUP
The developed modular QKD setup consists of two es-
sential components, Alice and Bob. Alice is in charge of
the quantum signals’ preparation, whereas Bob measures
the results. Fig. 1 shows a photo of Alice’s unit (Bob’s
unit looks similarly). The laser module, phase, and am-
plitude modulator drivers are implemented in the form
of such cards. The main function of the motherboard is
to provide commutation between add-on cards and the
NI board, installed in a PC and connected to the moth-
erboard via a PCI cable. In addition, the motherboard
implements the power supply control and executes a de-
laying of electric pulses to apply them at the correct time
to optical and amplitude modulators.
Figure 1. The developed modular QKD setup for R&D ap-
plications and educational purposes
.
On the top side of the Bob or Alice unit, there is an
optic table, where fiber optic components can be set-
tled. Thus, the developed modular QKD setup is easily
reachable from all sides. One can then easily reconfigure
both the optical scheme and the set of electronic driver
cards. A sufficient amount of additional SMA connectors
allows connecting an oscilloscope in order to investigate
the shape of electrical pulses and their position on the
timescale. These units are supplied with removable cov-
ers for transportation.
The details of the developed QKD setup are as fol-
lows. The semiconductor laser LDI-DFB2.5G generates
optical pulses 2 ns wide on the standard telecommuni-
cation wavelength 1.55 µm, the frequency is up to 10
MHz. The circulator, beamsplitters, Faraday mirror,
and phase modulators are standard components. The
quantum channel and storage line are single mode optical
fibers. Overall control of the electro-optic components is
realized by NI PCIe-7811R installed in the correspond-
ing PC (Bob or Alice). In total each device can drive
up to 8 detectors, 7 slow ports (VOA and etc.), 10 SMA
ports, 3 VHDCI ports, and 5 universal ports for lasers,
phase or amplitude modulators supporting both parallel
and serial interfaces.
The sifted keys from the hardware engine of the mod-
ular QKD setup are the input for post processing. The
post-processing procedures of sifted keys are an inherent
part of both industrial and R&D oriented QKD systems.
This procedure consists of information reconciliation, pa-
rameter estimation, and privacy amplification. The de-
signed modular QKD setup uses proof-of-principle real-
izations of the procedure described in Refs. [25–29]. We
describe the post-processing procedure in more details
below (see Sec. V).
III. PLUG-AND-PLAY QKD SCHEME: BB84
We start tests of the developed setup from assembling
a simplified version of the plug-and-play QKD scheme
with the BB84 protocol without decoy states in various
regimes (i.e. without the use of the amplitude modula-
tors in our scheme, see Fig. 2). The used plug-and-play
scheme, in this case, has a simple configuration. Thus,
it is a perfect starting point for introductory studies in
QKD (for details of the scheme, see Refs. [10, 33, 35–37]).
Parameters Laboratory conditions Urban conditions
L 25.5 km 30.6 km
Attn 4.8 dB 11.7 dB
QBER 1.6% 5.1%
Rrec 3.2 kbit/s 1.5 kbit/s
Table I. Implementation parameters and experimen-
tal results on realization of the plug-and-play scheme
with the BB84 protocol. Results of operating of the de-
veloped setup in laboratory and urban conditions, where L
is the length of the communication channel and Attn is the
total attenuation. The generation rate Rrec is for keys after
information reconciliation.
The QKD procedure includes repetitive sessions of 103
trains with Nt = 2.4×103 pulses in each train. In our ex-
periments with the plug-and-play QKD scheme. We use
as short as possible time window in order to reduce the
value of quantum bit error rate (QBER) in the laboratory
conditions. The raw key goes on the sifting procedure af-
ter each session via the (authenticated) public channel by
the TCP/IP protocol. The data are obtained as a result
of a five-day continuous operation in the laboratory, in-
3Figure 2. The developed modular QKD setup for R&D applications and educational purposes. The used scheme is demon-
strated: D1 and D2 are single-photon detectors, BS is the beamsplitter, PBS is the polarization beamsplitter, PM is the phase
modulator, AM is the amplitude modulator, VOA is the variable optical attenuator, FM is the Faraday mirror, QC is the
quantum channel, SL is the storage line, DL is the delay line, SD is the synchro detector, C is the circulator, and PC is the
personal computer. The operation is controlled by NI Boards connected via the Ethernet channel.
cluding unsupervised work. The output data are a truly
random 70.2 MB keys. We should point that the oper-
ating of the setup is noisy, in particular, the standard
deviation of QBER σ(QBER) = 0.59 is significant.
We also present the result of testing of the devel-
oped QKD setup with improved stability. The results
of the operating of the developed QKD setup are pre-
sented in Table I. After the stability improvement (both
in hardware and software), the setup shows less noisy
operation. During the 18 hours of intermittent work, 4
MB key was distributed with 1.6 average QBER. The
value of the standard deviation σ(QBER) = 0.25 in
the stability regions is lower significantly than before
(σ(QBER) = 0.59).
Although the fact that the developed QKD setup is ori-
ented on education and research applications, it demon-
strates a high degree of robustness beyond laboratory
conditions. We present the results of the test of the de-
veloped setup between two bank offices in Moscow with
the fully functional plug-and-play scheme. The param-
eters of the experiment and the results of the operating
of the developed QKD setup in the urban conditions are
presented in Table I. The highest achievable sifted key
generation rate is close to 2.2 kbit/s. We should point out
that this behavior is similar to the performance of IDQ’s
system [11] and the recently presented QKD system [16].
However, the fact that this data is obtained in urban
conditions is important. In particular, in urban fibers
lines, the effect of crosstalk on QBER can become signif-
icant [37]. We also tested the setup for establishing a link
in a heterogeneous quantum network in Moscow [38].
As it was mentioned before, the important lack of such
implementations of QKD setups for R&D applications is
missing decoy-states protocols. That is the reason why
for realistic experimental parameters we demonstrate the
key rates after the information reconciliation stage, but
not after privacy amplification (see Table I).
IV. DECOY-STATE QKD PROTOCOL
To exclude the shortcoming of our modular QKD setup
regarding to missing the decoy-states method, we demon-
strate the results of its implementation. The decoy-state
technique [19–22] can guarantee the security of the BB84
protocol over long distances, and it has already been re-
alized in most of QKD systems. However, this method is
not adopted in R&D setups.
The decoy-state method is based on using laser pulses
with different intensities. The intensities are chosen form
a certain finite set. The choices for the pulses are kept
in secret by Alice, but are publicly announced after the
reception of all pulses by Bob. By analyzing (i) statistics
of reception for pulses with different intensities and (ii)
error rates for different intensities, one can estimate the
fraction of single-photon pulses and the error rate for
single-photon pulses. In particular, this allows detecting
the photon number splitting attack [19–22, 39–42].
Pulse type Intensity Probability of generation
Signal µ = 0.3 pµ = 0.5
Decoy ν = 0.1 pν = 0.25
Vacuum λ = 0.007 pλ = 0.25
Table II. Parameters of the decoy-state protocol.
In our setup, we used a finite-key version of the decoy
statistics analysis described in Ref. [42]. We employ three
types of pulses: “signal pulse” µ > 0 with the probability
pµ, “weak decoy pulse” ν > 0 with the probability pν ,
and “vacuum pulse” λ ≥ 0 with the probability pλ =
1 − pµ − pν . We note that the intensity of the “vacuum
state” λ is close to zero, but not exactly zero due to the
technical reasons. In the developed setup, it was at the
level of λ = 0.07. In fact, the “vacuum intensity” is the
second decoy intensity. It is required that λ < ν/2 and
4Figure 3. Operating of the setup with the use of the BB84
QKD protocol with the use of decoy states. QBER is shown
as the function of the bit block number (time). We demon-
strate how the settings drift over time and after the adjusting
procedure QBER returns to reasonable values.
λ + ν < µ. The parameters of the implemented decoy-
state protocol are summarized in Table II.
L 10 km
Attn 4.3 dB
QBER 2.1 %
Rsec 0.4 kbit/s
Table III. Experimental results on realization of the
decoy-state protocol. The generation rates Rsec is for se-
cure keys obtained after the privacy amplification stage given
by Eq. (3).
To test the performance of our decoy-state protocol we
conducted an experiment in the laboratory conditions.
Again the QKD procedure includes repetitive sessions of
103 trains with Nt = 10
3 pulses in each train. The laser
source under the control of the NI PCle-7841R board gen-
erates optical pulses 3 ns wide on the standard telecom-
munication wavelength 1.55 µm with the pulse repletion
rate 5 MHz. Parameters of the experiment and result-
ing secure key rate are presented in Table III. Operating
of the setup with the use of the BB84 QKD protocol
with the use of decoy states is presented in Fig. 3. The
employed post-processing procedure, that is used for the
secure key generation, is presented in the next section.
V. POST-PROCESSING PROCEDURE
Our post-processing procedure works as follows. Sifted
keys go through the information reconciliation stage that
is adjusted by the current value of QBER. This stage has
two basic steps. The first is to use the LDPC syndrome
coding/decoding [43, 44] to correct discrepancies between
keys using symmetric blind reconciliation [25]. The uni-
versal polynomial hashing [45] aimed at the verification
of the identity between keys after the previous step is
used as the second one [29]. As a result, Alice and Bob
obtain a pair of verified keys which are identical up to
verification error probability εec. In our setup, we chose
the parameters of employed polynomial hashing to have
εec = 2 · 10−11.
We note that the implemented information reconcil-
iation procedure allows a significant increase in the ef-
ficiency of the procedure and reducing its interactiv-
ity [25]. After the accumulation of a necessary number
of blocks, the input goes to the parameter estimation.
If an estimated value of QBER is higher than the crit-
ical value needed for efficient privacy amplification, the
parties receive a warning message about possible eaves-
dropping. Otherwise, the verified blocks input privacy
amplification stage, and estimated QBER is used in next
rounds [25, 28].
The privacy amplification stage is used to reduce po-
tential information of an adversary about the verified
blocks to a negligible quantity. This is achieved by a con-
traction of the input bit string into a shorter string. The
first problem of this stage is to determine the length lsec of
the final secret key (for each verified block) that provides
the desired upper bound εpa of the failure probability of
this stage. We have adopted the value εpa = 10
−12.
Adaptation of formulas from Refs. [46, 47] to our case
leads to the following result:
lsec = κˆ
l
1lver[1− h(eˆu1)]− leakec + 5 log2 εpa. (1)
Here lver is the length of the verified block, leakec is the
number of bits of information about the verified block
leaked to Eve during the information reconciliation stage,
h(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x) (2)
is the binary entropy function. We should point out that
the main difference is that, QBER in our scheme is cal-
culated after the error correction stage, not by random
sampling from the sifted keys.
Further, κˆl1 is a lower bound on the number of positions
(bits) in the verified block obtained from single-photon
pulses and eˆu1 is an upper bound the fraction of errors in
such positions (corrected on the error correction stage),
The estimation of κˆl1 and eˆ
u
1 is given by the processing the
decoy state statistics, which is described in Ref. [42]. The
quantity h(eˆu1) determines the potential knowledge of the
bits obtained from single-photon pulses by the eavesdrop-
per. This reflects the essence of QKD: it is impossible to
get knowledge of the bits of the sifted key obtained from
single-photon pulses without introducing errors in them.
If lsec given by Eq. (1) is positive, then the secret key
distribution is possible for the considered verified block.
If τ is the time needed to generate a verified block with
the length lver, then the secret key rate is as follows:
Rsec = lsec/τ. (3)
After the calculation of the length of a final key (for
each verified block), the privacy amplification itself is
performed: the block of the final key is computed as a
5hash function of the verified block. The family of hash
functions is required to be 2-universal. In the developed
setup, we employed a Toeplitz hashing for this purpose.
VI. DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK
We have present the modular QKD setup for R&D
applications and educational purposes. An important
feature of the developed apparatus is its flexibility offer-
ing possibilities for modifying optical schemes and testing
novel QKD protocols. Another distinctive feature of the
developed setup is the implementation of the decoy-state
protocol. We have demonstrated the results of testing
the plug-and-play scheme realizing BB84 and decoy-state
BB84 QKD protocols. We have also used the setup for
distribution of keys between two bank offices in Moscow.
Due to the quantum basis and optical methods of in-
formation transfer, the developed modular QKD setup is
well suited for the education of undergraduate students.
Taking into account challenging tasks to generate, con-
trol, modify and synchronize electric and optical pulses,
it is a powerful course for engineers. Involving the neces-
sity to correct errors in sifted keys and privacy amplifica-
tion, we get a wide field for research for mathematicians.
Additional modules for preparation, manipulation, and
measurements of quantum states allows one to investi-
gate novel QKD protocols and attack scenarios.
LabView code for control and operating is available on
the public, free repository [23]. Our source code for a
proof-of-principle realization of the post-processing pro-
cedure is available [25]. We should also note that result-
ing keys can be used for a variety of external applications,
and our protocol (client API) for possible applications is
freely distributed as well [30].
Further steps of our work include the study of paral-
lelization of the developed post-processing procedure, in-
vestigation of a possible speed-up, and comparison with
forefront QKD software projects such as R10 by AIT [48]
with focus on creating QKD network solutions [38, 49].
In particular, we note that the presented scheme can be
used a testing platform for novel tools for overcoming the
detection-efficiency mismatch problem in the decoy-state
protocol [50, 51]. We also looking for an extensions of
possible educational activities with this setup [52].
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